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Eroding the Foundations of 
International Humanitarian Law: 
The United States Post-9/11 
Colonel (Retired) Morris Davis* 
It is a real privilege to be back here at Case Western Reserve. As 
Professor Scharf mentioned, this is my third time standing here and 
talking to this audience. Some of you have been here for all three, and 
for some, this is the first, but it really is a privilege. I mean, for two 
counts: 
Mainly, it is good to be out of Washington. The air just seems 
much fresher here in Cleveland than Washington. If you were up last 
night, as I was, watching to see if our government was going to pass a 
budget and get back to work, it just seems a lot fresher here than it 
does back in D.C. So I am glad to be here and not there. 
Second—and probably most importantly—I told my wife before I 
left, I said, “God, I hope they give me another one of those Case 
Western pullover police jackets,” because I got a blue one when I was 
here the first time, and I got a tan or a beige one the second time, 
 
* Colonel (retired) Morris Davis is Assistant Professor at Howard 
University School of Law and former Chief Prosecutor for the Military 
Commissions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Morris Davis is an attorney 
and a national security, military and international humanitarian law 
commentator. He is a 2013 Hugh M. Hefner First Amendment Award 
winner. He served in the Air Force JAG from 1983 to 2008 and retired 
as a Colonel. He was Chief Prosecutor for the Military Commissions at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, from 2005 to 2007 where he led a multi-agency 
prosecution task force of over 100 personnel from DOD, DOJ, CIA and 
FBI. He resigned in 2007 rather than use evidence obtained by torture 
or tolerate political meddling. His final military assignment was as 
Director of the Air Force Judiciary where he oversaw the criminal 
justice system and supervised 265 people at sites worldwide. He served 
as a Senior Specialist in National Security and Director of the Foreign 
Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division at the Congressional Research 
Service from 2008 to 2010. He was Executive Director of the Crimes of 
War Education Project from 2010 to 2011. He joined the faculty at the 
Howard University School of Law in July 2011. Colonel Davis earned a 
B.S. in criminal justice from Appalachian State University, a J.D. from 
North Carolina Central University School of Law, an L.L.M. in 
government procurement law from George Washington University 
School of Law, and an L.L.M in military law from the U.S. Army JAG 
School. His military decorations include the Legion of Merit, six 
Meritorious Service Medals, the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary 
Medal, and Global War on Terrorism Service Medal. He was included in 
the Center for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington report, “Those 
Who Dared: 30 Officials Who Stood Up for Our Country,” in July 2008 
and he received the Justice Charles E. Whittaker Award from the 
Lawyers Association of Kansas City in November 2009. 
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and this time I got a gray one. And I have just about worn out the 
first two. So I have to come here at least every two years to get a new 
pullover because I wear those things constantly in the summer. 
Apparently, there are a lot of Case alumni in the D.C. area 
because when I wear it, I get stopped quite often. “Hey, did you go to 
Case, too?” And this is my fourth trip because Henry King invited me 
back for the Niagara Moot Court competitions. So I think after four 
trips here, I at least qualify for a Masters or something. 
So it really is a privilege, and thank you to Professor Scharf, 
Professor Cover, and to Ms. Pratt and all the others who have gone 
out of their way to make this possible. And also, thank you to 
Howard University for allowing me to be here. 
As Professor Cover mentioned, I resigned during the Bush 
Administration, which didn’t endear me to the Republican side, and 
then I criticized President Obama for back peddling on Guantanamo, 
which didn’t endear me to the Democrats. And in Washington, when 
you aggravate both the Republicans and the Democrats, finding a job 
can be difficult. So I am very grateful to Howard University for giving 
me a home for the last three years and the freedom to go out and 
write and speak and do the kind of things that I think are important. 
And so it is a great privilege to be here. 
At times I feel like Don Quixote, tilting at this windmill at 
Guantanamo that has been there now for eleven and a half years and 
this military commissions process that President Bush authorized on 
November 13, 2001. So almost a dozen years we have been attempting 
this process, and it has been a failure. 
And it is discouraging at times, but to me, I am optimistic 
because of people like you; that you will take an hour out of your day 
and come and sit and listen, and you came before to hear General 
Martins. And I really appreciate that: that you are willing to take 
time to think and listen where, for the vast majority of the public, 
this is out of sight and out of mind, and they don’t really care. So I 
commend you for your commitment. 
So what I want to talk about today is how I went from the guy 
on the top row (when I am standing on the steps of the courthouse in 
Washington or standing on the steps of the courthouse in 
Guantanamo) defending the process, as the leading advocate for 
Guantanamo, to the person on the bottom row who is speaking out in 
the media, who went from standing on the steps of the courthouse to 
standing on the steps of the White House leading a protest to close 
Guantanamo. It seems like a change of position that seems impossible 
to imagine, and I am often asked if—at the top row—if I was 
insincere in just toeing the company line, and what I hope to show 
you today is that I wasn’t. I believe we were committed to doing this 
right. 
I told the first meeting I had with the prosecution team in 2005, I 
mean, this school has a close connection to Nuremberg and Henry 
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King. When I was here in 2006 and I spoke, there was a faculty 
luncheon, and I did a presentation for the faculty at the luncheon. 
And Henry King came up to me afterwards and stuck his finger out 
and said “It was important to Robert Jackson that we do it right at 
Nuremberg. Don’t you screw it up at Guantanamo.” 
And I told the prosecution team in that first meeting that we are 
going to do this right. We are not going to use evidence used by the 
enhanced interrogation techniques that went too far, and I don’t want 
any of you to do anything you feel is illegal or immoral or unethical. I 
would like for our grandkids to be able to look back at Guantanamo 
the way that we look at Nuremberg. And so I believe that we were 
committed to doing that for a number of years, but by the summer of 
2007, I became concerned that that wasn’t our commitment, and 
that’s when I chose to resign.  
So I have kind of an aggressive agenda for today. There are really 
four segments to this talk, and I have done hour-long talks for each of 
those segments, and trying to take four hours and cram it into about 
thirty minutes is going to be a challenge. So hang on, and we will try 
to get through this because I think it is important. 
President Obama has given a series of talks. Unfortunately, we 
don’t need a lecturer; we need a leader, and I think that’s where this 
Administration has failed in providing leadership on this issue on the 
War on Terror and how we choose to respond to it, because as the 
President said in the speech he gave at the National Archives back in 
May of 2009, it really is our values and our principles. When you talk 
about American exceptionalism, that’s what made us  
exceptional—our belief and the rule of law.1 
Unfortunately, since 9/11, rule of law are laws that are 
consistently well-known and consistently applied, but unfortunately, 
we have treated the rule of law as a slide rule, where it slides to fit 
whatever we find convenient at the moment, and I think it is in our 
interest to get back to being the champion of the rule of law and not 
just people that talk about it. And there have been a number of 
critics of the Administration and the U.S. in this post-9/11 policy 
that we have adopted. There are rules that apply to others. You 
know, we condemn others for doing things that we condone when we 
do it ourselves. 
And I think you have to question, you know, we have this 
incredible technology. We have the strongest fighting force in the 
world: this country with incredible capability, but are we 
accomplishing what we really want to accomplish when we are using 
this power in ways that I think may be tactically advantageous at the 
 
1. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National 
Security at the National Archives (May 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-national-
security-5-21-09. 
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moment, but I think long-term, strategically, we are going to regret 
some of the decisions we have made? 
So real quickly, if you think about it, it seems like an oxymoron: 
the law of war. You know, if you are angry enough to go to war, then 
it ought to be in some people’s mind any means necessary to win, and 
this notion of having rules that apply just doesn’t seem to fit for 
many. But if you think about conflict, if you go back to the early 
days (the original first days of man), if you want to kill someone, you 
had to actually have physical contact with them. You had to pick up 
a rock and hit them in the head or strangle them or something. You 
had to actually physically contact them. And then the sword came 
along, so you could stand three feet off and kill them. And then the 
bow and arrow—you could be twenty or thirty yards away—and then 
the musket, and then all the things that have evolved. 
We have made it so much more convenient to kill each other. I 
mean, for example, currently, there is a debate about the drone 
policy, which I think is a bit of a misnomer. I will talk about drones 
more a little later, but you have got the drone operators at Creech 
Air Force base in Nevada. So picture base housing at Creech Air 
Force base: they get up in the morning, they have breakfast with the 
kids, go off to the office, sit in a comfortable chair in an air 
conditioned room, and then 7,650 miles away on the border of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan is where the drone strikes take place. And 
then at the end of the day, they go home, they attend their kids’ 
soccer game and go to bed and get up the next morning and do it all 
over again without ever actually having to see or have contact with 
the people that are being impacted on the other end. So we have 
made it so convenient to kill one another that I think it is critically 
important that we have rules in place for how we use that power. 
Now the evolution of international humanitarian law or the law of 
war is not something that just occurred. I mean, you can go back as 
far back as Moses—go back to Deuteronomy—and in there, it talks 
about the rules that apply when you are holding a city in siege. And 
then up to Hugo Grotius and the just war theory2 or Henry Dunant in 
his book A Memory of Solferino and the battle that took place there 
that led to him leading the effort to create the International 
Committee of the Red Cross3 that to this day is still the leading 
organization in IHL. You know, Henry Dunant was the winner of the 
first Nobel Peace Prize, which President Obama went on to win later, 
and whom I think is the only Nobel Peace Prize winner with a kill 
list. And then on to Francis Lieber, who during the Civil War, 
 
2. See, e.g., Brian Orend, War, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/war/.  
3. See History of the ICRC, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/en/history (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2014). 
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drafted—at Lincoln’s request—the Lieber Code that Lincoln 
implemented, that were rules governing the conduct of Union forces 
during the Civil War.4 So we have had this long history of having 
rules on how we conduct conflict. 
So I want to jump forward from that to a modern era, which I 
think really began with World War II. You know, one of the nice 
things about being the United States is we won. I mean, if you notice 
the people that are held accountable in war crimes tribunals, you 
don’t see the winners showing up in those tribunals, because I think 
people could argue reasonably the use of the atomic nuclear weapons. 
We are the only country that has ever used nuclear weapons. And I 
think you can make an argument on proportionality, necessity and all 
those things. But fortunately we won, and we didn’t have to answer 
those questions. 
But we saw what happened during World War II, the atrocities 
that took place, and at the end of the war, we were pretty much left 
unscathed. You know, Europe was decimated, Russia was decimated, 
Japan was decimated, and we were largely left as the real super power 
in the world. And so after witnessing what we had seen in World War 
II, the United States became the leader of the effort to codify this 
body of international humanitarian law in order not to repeat the 
mistakes that we saw during World War II. 
You know, one of the things we did—and as Henry King is 
certainly famous for—were the Nuremberg trials. Rather than, as 
some wanted to do, just taking the Nazis out and shooting them, we 
actually gave them trials, and some of the accused were acquitted, 
and some were ultimately executed, but we didn’t just take them out 
and shoot them. We put together a process that by today’s standards 
doesn’t measure up, but by the standards that existed back in the 
1940s, Nuremberg was an incredible accomplishment and one that we 
ought to be proud of. 
And from that, in 1945, we brought the nations of the world 
together, and we created the United Nations. The last big conference 
was held in San Francisco in 1945, and later that year, most countries 
signed on to the U.N. Charter, which, again, is a body of law to try to 
regulate the use of force. 
And hopefully, if we have time at the end, we will talk just a 
minute about one of my concerns, which was when we were about to 
bomb Syria, and whether that was permissible under this body of law 
that we created in the U.N. Charter, where it says you have the right 
to use force if you have been attacked or for imminent self-defense or 
 
4. Francis Lieber, General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the 
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, in SERIES III-
VOL. III, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES 148–64 (1863), 
available at http://digital.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/waro.html. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2014 
Eroding the Foundations of International Humanitarian Law 
504 
with the authorization of the international community, none of which 
in my view applied in Syria. 
But we led the effort to create this organization to try to resolve 
conflict and avoid having wars and to regulate the behavior of 
countries. We also led the effort in the creation of the Geneva 
Conventions,5 again a body of law, the various conventions that 
govern the treatment of detainees and the protected status of 
personnel, of civilians, and medical personnel and others to try to 
contain the effect of armed conflict, to keep it to the battlefield and 
amongst the combatants, and to protect and mitigate the suffering of 
others, and we led the effort. So coming out of the World War II era, 
we were the champions of international humanitarian law—this body 
of law that we wanted to spread around the world. 
The Senate held hearings in 1955 on ratifying the Geneva 
Conventions, and Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy 
testified at those hearings.6 And you can see what he said here about 
the Geneva Conventions and why the Senate should ratify them, 
saying that “They reflect enlightened practices as carried out by the 
United States and other civilized countries and they represent largely 
what the United States would do whether or not a party to the 
conventions. Our own conduct has served to establish higher 
standards and we can only benefit by having them incorporated in a 
stronger body of conventional wartime law.”7 
So you hear that talk about the United States being that shining 
city on a hill and a light into the world. Under Secretary Murphy was 
saying, in the conduct of war, we are the benchmark. We set the 
standard, and by adopting this body of law, we are bringing 
everybody up to our example and our standard. 
Now, fast-forward a bit, and many of you in this room are too 
young to remember, but the first Gulf War in 1991. If you recall, 
when the ground war started, our troops went from the border of 
Kuwait and Iraq to the outskirts of Baghdad in about a hundred 
 
5. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
6. See Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims: Hearing on 
Executives D, E, F, and G Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
84th Cong. 5 (1955) (statement of Robert Murphy, Under Sec’y of 
State). 
7. Id. 
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hours. We had a total of about 120 casualties during the war.8 Some 
of those were accidents and heart attacks and other things. There 
were few that were actually combat fatalities. 
And if you recall, the bottom picture shows the Iraqi forces 
surrendered by the tens of thousands without firing a shot. Why did 
they do that? Anybody? Why did they surrender rather than fight? 
When they saw the U.S. forces, why did they put their guns down 
and put their hands up? 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: They knew they were safe. 
PROFESSOR DAVIS: Exactly. They knew who we were. We were 
the good guys that rather than fight, if they surrendered, the United 
States would give them shelter and food and medical care. They 
wouldn’t be abused, and they chose to quit. 
I can tell you as a guy who spent twenty-five years in uniform, I 
would prefer the enemy put down their guns and put up their hands 
and say, “I quit.” I think it is in our national interest to regain that 
reputation, because I question today—I mean, if you look at the 
attitude in that region about the U.S., after things like Abu Ghraib 
and Guantanamo and water boarding and indefinite detention and 
drone strikes, those guys you see at the bottom, if they thought they 
were going to be held indefinitely, sexually humiliated, water boarded, 
would they put their guns down and quit, or would they fight? I think 
many would fight. 
So I think it behooves us to get back to the day when the U.S. 
was viewed as the good guy that you could trust to treat you right 
and not to abuse you the way that we have done since 9/11. We used 
to be the land of the free and the home of the brave, and after 9/11, 
we became the constrained and the cowardly. We are what we stood 
for. Those principles that President Obama talked about became an 
inconvenience, and we were scared, and we told the government to do 
whatever you got to do to keep us safe. 
I mean I tell my students at Howard, I remember—I am old 
enough to remember—going to the airport, if somebody felt you up, it 
was called a sexual assault, not pre-boarding. That’s become the new 
normal. If you look at the American Red Cross, which did a survey on 
torture, the majority of the public had shifted during the Bush 
Administration, and the majority of the American public was opposed 
to torture. Now, the majority of the American public is okay with 
torture. And the younger the person asked, the more accepting they 
are because there is this whole post-9/11 new normal that many have 
grown up and come to accept. 
 
8. See NESE F. DEBRUYNE & ANNE LELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL32492, AMERICAN WAR AND MILITARY OPERATIONS CASUALTIES: 
LISTS AND STATISTICS 3, 11 (2014). 
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So I hope we can get back to a day where we don’t focus on 9/11; 
we focus on 9/10 and how we lived before we got scared, and I think 
we ought to go back to being the land of the free and the home of the 
brave and quit living in fear. 
Remember in this body of law that we led the effort to create 
after 9/11, it became an impediment, and you can see the memo from 
Alberto Gonzales to the President saying that the Geneva 
Conventions—remember the thing we led the effort to create?—that 
many of the limitations on questioning enemy prisoners are rendered 
“quaint”9 and that his view is that some of the provisions are 
obsolete. 
So this body of law that we led the effort to create, we now are 
discarding and setting aside as being quaint and obsolete because it is 
an impediment to what we want to do, which is to avoid the law. You 
had the memorandum from John Yoo, where again, he says that the 
Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law don’t apply 
to this conflict with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.10 
Now, there were some that pushed back: William Taft was a legal 
adviser to Colin Powell at the State Department. You can see this is 
John Yoo’s memo on January 9, 2002. Taft wrote back to him on 
January 11, 2002.11 Does anybody else know what happened on 
January 11, 2002? 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Guantanamo. 
PROFESSOR DAVIS: The first detainees: the plane landed at 
Guantanamo that same day, January 11th.12 Why did we choose 
Guantanamo to detain these guys? Why fly them halfway around the 
 
9. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, on 
Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War 
to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, to President George  
W. Bush 2 (Jan. 25, 2002), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf.  
10. Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.,  
on Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban  
Detainees, to William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel,  
DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Jan. 9, 2002), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.09.pdf. 
11. Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, on Draft 
Memorandum of January 9, to John C. Yoo, Deputy  
Assistant Att’y Gen. (Jan. 11, 2002), available at 
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/70949/00137_020111_001di
splay.pdf. 
12. Shackled Detainees Arrive in Guantanamo, CNN WORLD (Jan. 11, 2002, 
11:28 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/01/ 
11/ret.detainee.transfer/index.html.  
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world? Why not detain them there? Why did we take them to 
Guantanamo? 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: The legal argument was it is a U.S. military 
zone, but it is outside the contiguous United States. 
PROFESSOR DAVIS: So no law applied. Remember, you know, 
what made us exceptional was our belief in the rule of law, and now 
we are doing everything possible to avoid the law: you know, saying 
the law doesn’t apply and picking this site that we thought was a 
law-free zone that the U.S. courts couldn’t touch and the 
international courts couldn’t touch and the Cuban courts couldn’t 
touch. It was the perfect place to exploit people for intelligence. So we 
chose Guantanamo. 
And you see, we had people push back like William Taft did, 
saying, “Look, I agree we really want to see what the boundaries are 
of what we can do in this War on Terror.” But you can see in this 
bottom paragraph saying, “Look, some of your conclusions you admit 
are questionable, and as this document will show, I expect that you 
will find they are actually incorrect as well as incomplete,” and he 
ends it saying “we should talk.” And of course they didn’t. 
Does anybody push back against what the Administration wanted 
to do, which included all of the judge advocate generals of the 
military services? People in uniform were uniformly opposed to 
Guantanamo and to the use of torture and to the use of military 
commissions, but like William Taft, they were maginalized because 
they weren’t saying what the Administration wanted to hear. 
And so we move forward. There is a memorandum by Jay Bybee, 
who at the time was the Assistant Attorney General.13 Does anybody 
know what Mr. Bybee does now? I mean, this is called the “Torture 
Memo” that he authored. Anybody know what he does now? 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Ninth Circuit Judge. 
PROFESSOR DAVIS: He has a lifetime appointment to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. It was his, I guess, 
punishment for having written the “Torture Memo.” 
In the memo, it says—now, again, remember we are the champion 
of the rule of law, the example, the shining city on a hill—and in this 
memo it says, Section 2340—that’s out of our domestic torture 
statute—anything we do in questioning detainees that doesn’t 
produce the level of pain that would be caused by “physical injury, 
such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death;” 
 
13. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., on Standards of 
Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, to Alberto 
R. Gonzales, White House Counsel (Aug. 1, 2002), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/doj/bybee80102mem.pdf.  
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anything short of that is fine.14 I mean, stop and think about that for 
a minute. The United States is saying any pain that is less than being 
strangled to death or your heart stopping—anything short of that we 
are good to go, which to me is a pretty remarkable statement for the 
United States to be making if we are the example for the world to 
follow. 
Probably even to me, even more incredible later in the memo it 
says even if you could make an argument that that level of pain is a 
violation of the torture statute, then it would be unconstitutional 
because, as it says, the President enjoys complete discretion in the 
exercise of his Commander-in-Chief authority in conducting 
operations against hostile forces.15 
So what does that mean? It means that neither Congress nor the 
courts have any authority to tell the President “You can’t do that.” 
So whatever the president says is untouchable, whether it is torture or 
a kill list or indefinite detention. The President has the unilateral 
authority to act, and there is nothing that anyone can do to challenge 
it. 
So in this body of international humanitarian law, now again, I 
think many of you are too young to remember this, but there was a 
time when Congress did things on a bipartisan basis. 
So back in 1994, we led the effort to create the Convention 
Against Torture.16 And after the Convention was passed, it came to 
Congress to be ratified in the Senate, and I forgot what the vote was. 
It was like 95 to 3.17 It was hugely popular on a bipartisan basis, and 
a lot of great speeches were given on the floor on why it was in our 
interest to sign on to the Convention Against Torture. 
And it is interesting if you look because the discussion centered 
on the fear of Americans being the victims of torture, not the 
perpetrators of torture, but in the Torture Convention that we led the 
effort to enact, it says there are “[n]o exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever” for torture.18 It says that every party to the Convention 
has to provide a legal mechanism for alleged victims of torture to seek 
compensation for their mistreatment,19 and it says you can’t outsource 
torture. You can’t hand someone off to another country that has a 
 
14. Id. at 1, 6.  
15. See id. at 31.    
16. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 113 (entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Convention 
Against Torture]. 
17. See 136 CONG. REC. S17486 (1990). 
18. Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 2(2).  
19. Id. art 14.  
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more morally casual attitude and let them do your dirty work. It is 
prohibited by the Convention.20 
Now, keep those provisions in mind: no exceptional circumstance 
whatsoever, a system, a legal system to provide compensation for 
alleged victims, and no outsourcing torture. All right. Did we torture, 
or did we not? I think it is clear that we did. John McCain has talked 
about it. Many others have talked about it. When I resigned as Chief 
Prosecutor for the Military Commissions, the person in charge of the 
Commissions was Susan Crawford, who is pictured here. She had been 
Dick Cheney’s Inspector General when Dick Cheney was the 
Secretary of Defense, and I mean, you just don’t get more Republican 
or more endeared to the Bush Administration than Susan Crawford, 
and Susan Crawford dismissed charges against Mohammed al-
Qahtani. It was the one case I was personally handling myself. 
He was the twentieth hijacker, the guy that when he landed in 
Orlando, an alert customs agent thought his story just didn’t make 
sense, and put him back on the plane, and sent him home. And he 
never made it to where he wanted to rendezvous with the other 
nineteen. But we mistreated al-Qahtani. It was the dirtiest of the 
cases before the high value detainees arrived, and I was handling it 
personally. 
In the spring of 2008, Ms. Crawford dismissed the charges against 
Mohammed al-Qahtani. In January of 2009, you can see on January 
14th in this article by Bob Woodward in the Washington Post, Ms. 
Crawford said she made the decision to dismiss charges because, 
quote, “We tortured [al-]Qahtani. His treatment met the legal 
definition of torture. And that’s why I did not refer the case.”21 
Mark Fallon was the Deputy Commander of CITF, the Criminal 
Investigation Task Force, the military organization that was 
responsible for trying to collect up all the bits and pieces of 
information on the detainees for us to be able to sit down with them 
and determine if there was a case that could be prosecuted. He was at 
Guantanamo in October of 2002. In this meeting with all the other 
agencies that were involved, and this is an e-mail he sent back to his 
boss saying, “What I am seeing down here are the ‘kinds of stuff that 
Congressional hearings are made of’ that someone from another 
organization, the CIA, said that if the detainee dies, then you are 
doing it wrong.”22 And he goes on to say that in his view someone 
 
20. See id. art. 3. 
21. Bob Woodward, Guantanamo Detainee Was Tortured, Says Official 
Overseeing Military Trials, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/13/ 
AR2009011303372.html. 
22. See Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Notes Show Confusion on 
Interrogation Methods, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2008), 
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ought to be paying attention to this because history is not going to 
look back favorably with what we were doing at Guantanamo. 
So what happened to all the people that put us on this road to 
turn our back on the law, to engage in torture, and to do all the other 
things that we have done? They have all been handsomely rewarded 
for their conduct. 
Jose Rodriguez was the head of Clandestine Operations for the 
CIA. You may recall there were tapes—videotapes of Abu Zubaydah 
and el-Masri being water boarded.23 A judge had ordered that they be 
preserved, and Mr. Rodriguez ordered that they be destroyed because 
they thought that the risk of that information getting out in the 
public and the public seeing what our government was doing was 
more harmful than ignoring the order and destroying the evidence.24 
As you can see, the Obama Administration made the decision that 
Mr. Rodriguez should not be prosecuted for what he did. Instead, he 
wrote a book, and he is on the lecture circuit and making a lot of 
money off of having sanctioned torture. 
In fact, if you look, the only person who has gone to jail for 
torture is not someone who sanctioned it or someone that conducted 
it. It is John Kiriakou, who is a CIA agent who talked about it, and 
John is doing thirty months in federal prison for having disclosed the 
name of the CIA agent who was involved in torture.25 
So, you know, we don’t punish the people that put the policy in 
place; we punish the guy that had the audacity to tell the public that 
we engaged in torture. Now, again, I mention the torture statute. As 
part of the Torture Convention, every country had to sign on and 
have a domestic law that criminalized torture. We passed one with 
flying colors in both the House and Senate. We used it one time. We 
prosecuted “Chuckie” Taylor—you know, Charles Taylor, the former 
President of Liberia that was convicted at the Hague not too long 
ago—we prosecuted his son in federal court.26 So we know how to use 
the statute. We prosecuted him for the atrocities he committed in 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ 
06/18/washington/18detain.html?_r=1&. 
23. Dan Eggen & Joby Warrick, CIA Destroyed Videos Showing 
Interrogations, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/06/AR2007120601828_pf.html.  
24. Id. 
25. John Kiriakou, Op-Ed., I Got 30 Months in Prison. Why Does Leon 
Panetta Get a Pass?, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2014), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2014/ mar/09/opinion/la-oe-kiriakou-
panetta-whistleblower-20140309  
26. Ex-Liberian Dictator Charles Taylor’s Son Sentenced to 97 Years in US 
Jail, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 9, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/northamerica/usa/4210623/Ex-Liberian-dictator-Charles-
Taylors-son-sentenced-to-97-years-in-US-jail.html. 
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Liberia, and he was sentenced to ninety-seven years in prison, in 
federal court.27 So we know how to use the testimony, but we have 
never used it. 
Maher Arar was a Canadian who flew to Tunisia with his family, 
and on the way back at JFK, he was taken off the plane, held for two 
weeks in the U.S., and then we put him on a plane, flew him to 
Jordan, and from Jordan, he was driven to Syria.28 Now, remember 
Syria? You know, Bashar al-Assad that we were planning on bombing 
not too long ago? We turned over Maher Arar to that same 
government, where he was tortured for about a year until they 
realized he was a nobody.29 
The Canadians, who had given us the information that led us to 
believe he might be a somebody, have apologized and paid him $10.5 
million for their part and us sending him off to be tortured.30 When he 
sued here—remember, this Convention says there has to be a means 
for people that are alleged victims of torture to seek  
compensation—the Obama Administration asserted the state secrets 
privilege, and the case was dismissed,31 and we never even apologized 
to Maher Arar for the year he spent in prison in Syria being abused 
thanks to us. He is an incredible guy. 
I teach a class in national security law, and he spoke to my class 
by Skype because he is barred from coming to the U.S., but he is a 
remarkable guy. He has completed his Ph.D. and is just a really 
interesting person. If we can’t apologize to Maher Arar for sending 
him to Syria, what does it say about us? 
And so, again, not a single person of this alleged—that had been 
tortured—has been able to hold the government accountable, either 
criminally or civilly, rather than be victims of the torture. So people 
tried. If you can’t sue the government, let’s sue the contractors, the 
businesses that profited by helping the government send us off to be 
tortured. 
 
27. Id. 
28. The Story of Maher Arar: Rendition to Torture, CTR. FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 2–4 (Dec. 2008), 
http://ccrjustice.org/files/FINAL%20updated%20rendition%20to%20tor
ture%20report%20dec%2008.pdf. 
29. Id. at 4. 
30. Id. at 8. 
31. Jerome Tuccille, Maher Arar Can’t Sue U.S. for Sending Him to Syria 
to Be Tortured, Says Court, EXAMINER (Nov. 3, 2009), 
http://www.examiner.com/article/maher-arar-can-t-sue-u-s-for-sending-
him-to-syria-to-be-tortured-says-court. 
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So they filed suit against Jeppesen, this company that does 
aeronautical planning.32 And what did the Administration do? They 
asserted the state secrets privilege saying, in order for this company 
to defend itself, we would have to give them classified information, 
and therefore, the case should be dismissed. And it was.33 
And now you can’t sue the government, and you can’t sue the 
companies that profited by helping the government when they 
outsourced torture. In fact, the latest company that was sued was 
CACI. The case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds,34 and the 
victims, the alleged victims of torture, were then sued by CACI for 
the alleged facilitator of torture to recover their attorney fees.35 And 
the court said, well, we do have jurisdiction to hear that one, and 
they have ordered the alleged victims now to pay the company that 
they had sued.36 
Any of you see Zero Dark Thirty? I didn’t. If it comes in Red 
Box, I would spend 99 cents to see it, but I was not going to help 
support it. You guys are probably too young to remember, but I 
remember when Jaws first came out. I had never seen a shark. But 
after seeing Jaws, I had some pretty firm opinions that the only good 
one was a dead one. 
My fear was that Zero Dark Thirty was going to do for torture 
what Jaws did for sharks, and people that had no experience with 
torture were going to sit down, and watch a movie, and come away 
with the conclusion that thirty minutes of torture leads to Osama bin 
Laden. Therefore, it is a good thing, and that was not the case. 
Actually, it is five years now I did an article in The New York 
Times criticizing our relaxing of the standards and using torture.37 If 
you all want to know about torture, there are two books I would 
recommend: one by Matthew Alexander, which is actually a 
pseudonym. He is actually a former Air Force officer named Tony 
 
32. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1092 (9th Cir. 
2010) (holding that the state secrets doctrine protects Jeppesen, the 
company who assisted the United States in the aeronautical planning for 
the transport of citizens such as plaintiff Maher). 
33. Id. at 1086, 1093. 
34. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 857, 857, 874 (E.D. Va. 
2013).  
35. Bill of Costs at 1, Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 857 
(E.D. Va. 2013) (No. 1:08-cv-00827). 
36. Id. (providing an updated and correct bill of attorney’s fees that the 
court ordered the victims to pay).  
37. Morris Davis, Op-Ed., Unforgivable Behavior, Inadmissible Evidence, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2008) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/17/opinion/ 
17davis.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
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Camarino, who had to write using a pseudonym at the time,38 and one 
by Ali Soufan, who was an FBI interrogator, who actually was the 
first to interrogate Abu Zubaydah and others.39 
So these guys: they are not like Dick Cheney, who has never 
interrogated a person in his life. They are people that spent their 
careers doing interrogations, and they both tell you torture doesn’t 
work. I mean, it is great for making somebody talk, but it is not good 
for making them tell you the truth, and the purpose of an 
interrogation is to get useful information, and they say it doesn’t 
work. 
Now, some other countries have not been as casual in their 
attitude as we have. The Italians have convicted twenty-three 
Americans for the abduction of Abu Omar, and then he was sent off 
to Egypt, where he was tortured.40 So there are people that aren’t 
quite as cavalier about it as we are. 
Now Guantanamo: again, we picked Guantanamo because it was 
viewed to be outside the reach of the law. There is an article recently: 
The Miami Herald is suing under FOIA.41 Camp Seven is where the 
high value detainees are held, and as you can see over the time that 
Guantanamo has been open, about eleven-and-a-half years, by the 
September of this fiscal year and by September 30th of next year, we 
will have spent $5.25 billion to detain people at Guantanamo, or $2.7 
million a year per person.42 
Now, there are 162 men at Guantanamo.43 There are 779 that 
were ever held there.44 There are 162 that are left.45 Eighty-two of the  
38. MATTHEW ALEXANDER & JOHN R. BRUNING, HOW TO BREAK A 
TERRORIST: THE U.S. INTERROGATORS WHO USED BRAINS, NOT 
BRUTALITY, TO TAKE DOWN THE DEADLIEST MAN IN IRAQ (2008).  
39. ALI H. SOUFAN & DANIEL FREEDMAN, THE BLACK BANNERS: THE INSIDE 
STORY OF 9/11 AND THE WAR AGAINST AL-QAEDA (2011).  
40. Ian Shapira, Italy’s High Court Upholds Convictions of 23 Americans in 
Abu Omar Rendition, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/italys-high-court-upholds-
convictions-of-23-americans-in-abu-omar-rendition/2012/09/19/ 
af06022c-0286-11e2-91e7-2962c74e7738_story.html. 
41. See Carol Rosenberg, FOIA Suit Reveals Guantánamo’s ‘Indefinite 
Detainees,’ MIAMI HERALD (June 17, 2013), http://www.miamiherald. 
com/2013/06/17/3456267/foia-suit-reveals-guantanamos.html. 
42. Carol Rosenberg, Total U.S. Tab Tops $5B for Guantánamo  
Prison, MIAMI HERALD (July 30, 2013), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/article1953705.html. 
43. General Who Opened Guantanamo Prison Urges for Shut-Down in 
2014, RT NEWS (Dec. 13, 2013, 4:11 PM), http://rt.com/usa/general-
guantanamo-urges-shut-down-162/.  
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
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162 are men that the CIA, the FBI, the Department of Justice, and 
the Department of Defense unanimously agree didn’t commit a 
crime.46 We are not going to charge them. They are not an imminent 
threat, and we don’t need to keep them. They published their report 
in January of 2010, saying these are men we don’t need to keep.47 
They are still there at a cost of $2.7 million a year each. So for the 
fiscal conservatives in the crowd, economically, Guantanamo doesn’t 
make sense in addition to the costs we pay, as far as our reputation. 
The military commissions, like I said, next year it will be twelve 
years since they were authorized. There have been a grand total of 
seven trials completed.48 Five of those seven men aren’t at 
Guantanamo anymore.49 They have gone home. So one of the jokes we 
used to make at Guantanamo was you got to lose to win because if 
you got charged with a war crime and convicted as a war criminal, 
you got a five in seven chance you are not at Guantanamo anymore; 
you are back home. But if you are never charged with a war crime, 
you could spend the rest of your life sitting there. 
In the picture is Abu Hamza al-Masri, who was extradited from 
the U.K. to the U.S.,50 and you got Abu Anas Al-Libi in the upper 
right-hand corner of the recent capture in the raid in Libya.51 You 
have got bin Laden’s son-in-law, whose name is escaping me, I can’t 
think of his name, and you have got Ahmed Ghailani depicted in the 
bottom corner.52 
What is unique about those four? What do they have in common? 
They either have been, or are being, prosecuted in federal court, not 
 
46. See Craig Whitlock, 82 Inmates Cleared But Still Held at Guatanamo, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/04/28/AR2007042801145.html. 
47. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ET AL., FINAL REPORT: GUANTANAMO REVIEW 
TASK FORCE 10 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/ 
guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf.  
48. Facts and Figures: Military Commissions v. Federal Courts, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/features/guantanamo-facts-figures 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2014).  
49. See The Guantanamo Trials, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
http://www.hrw.org/features/guantanamo (last visited Dec. 30, 2014). 
50. Adam Brookes, Abu Hamza Arrives at RAF Mildenhall for US 
Extradition, BBC (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
19852506. 
51. Mark Hosenball & Phil Stewart, Abu Anas Al-Libi, Senior Al Qaeda 
Figure Captured in Libya, Questioned on U.S. Ship, REUTERS (Jan. 23, 
2014, 6:58 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/07/abu-anas-
al-libi-ship_n_4058559.html.  
52. See The Guantanamo Trials, supra note 49. 
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in a military commission at Guantanamo.53 So I think it is a pretty 
powerful statement. Like in Abu Hamza al-Masri, we had to promise 
the U.K.—our closest friend and ally—we had to promise we wouldn’t 
take him to Guantanamo.54 We wouldn’t prosecute him in a military 
commission, which is a pretty strong statement from our closest friend 
on what they think about Guantanamo and the military commission. 
And the President has chosen Ahmed Ghailani. When I was the 
Chief Prosecutor in September 2006, a plane landed at Guantanamo, 
and fourteen men got off. Only one has been convicted and sentenced, 
and it was Ahmed Ghailani in federal court, not at the military 
commission at Guantanamo.55 
So I started a petition in May of this year to close Guantanamo, 
and mainly because of my own procrastination, it happened to go up 
the morning that the President talked about Guantanamo at a press 
conference. So it looked like it was this coordinated process, but it 
was entirely a fluke that it happened on the same day. But 23,000 
people signed my petition to tell the President to close Guantanamo, 
and he invited me to his speech he gave in May, where he said we are 
going to close Guantanamo. It is a blight on the country, and here we 
are in October, and there are still 162 men there, the majority of 
whom have been cleared for transfer but are still at Guantanamo. 
Let me end up with drones. Here is a list: nobody has an exact 
figure on how many people have been killed in drone strikes around 
the world. I think this is probably as good a data as you are going to 
get. So I know the Administration likes to portray it as this precision 
weapon—you know, we can mitigate the risk to the civilian  
population—but it is not error-free, and there is no doubt that a lot 
of people have died as a result of drone strikes. 
I am not opposed to drones as a weapon system. It is like an  
F-16, but instead of sitting in the cockpit, you sit in an air-
conditioned room at Creech Air Force Base and fly it. It is our policy 
for how we use it that causes me concern. Mainly it’s this policy of 
 
53. Aki Peritz & Mieke Eoyang, Even al Qaeda Operatives Deserve Their 
Day in Court – and Justice, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2014, 6:58 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aki-peritz/even-al-qaeda-
operatives-_b_4109812.html?view=print&comm_ref=false 2/2; Abu 
Hamza Terror Trial Begins with Jury Selection in US, BBC (Apr. 14, 
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-
27015350?print=true; Benjamin Weiser, Jurors Convict Abu Ghaith, 
Bin Laden Son-in-Law, in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/27/nyregion/bin-ladens-son-in-law-is-
convicted-in-terror-trial.html?_r=0; Benjamin Weiser, Detainee 
Acquitted on Most Counts in ‘98 Bombings, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/nyregion/18ghailani.html. 
54. See Brookes, supra note 50. 
55. See The Guantanamo Trials, supra note 49. 
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having a separate agency. The military drone program comes under 
IHL and the law of war. We have another drone program run by the 
CIA, a civilian agency, that’s not part of the military and not covered 
by IHL, carrying out lethal, offensive, military operations, and I don’t 
know any legal basis for the President to tell a civilian agency to go 
kill someone in another country. 
So I am concerned about the policy that we have used. You know, 
the majority of Americans are opposed to drone strikes on Americans, 
like we did with Anwar al-Awlaki and his son.56 Did you see, they 
were opposed to using them on us, but they were okay with using 
them on other people, but other people aren’t happy about being on 
the receiving end. You know, we want to win hearts and minds in this 
War on Terror. 
In Pakistan, three quarters of the Pakistani public have spent 
billions of dollars. Three quarters of the Pakistani people consider us 
to be the enemy. The U.N. sent Ben Emmerson to Pakistan. He 
concluded that our use of drones there has been an invasion of their 
sovereignty and that we certainly wouldn’t condone it if someone 
were doing the same here.57 And more recently, you had Malala, who 
last week told the President “Hey, stop droning us because you are 
making enemies of innocent victims in Pakistan.”58 Yet, the program 
continues. 
So I just want to wrap up real quickly. This is my concern on 
where we are headed, so bear with me: just a short three-minute clip 
that I think this is what you ought to be thinking about going 
forward and the precedent that we are setting in this effort. 
 
56. See Mark Mazzetti, Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, How a U.S. Citizen 
Came to Be in America’s Cross Hairs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/middleeast/anwar-al-
awlaki-a-us-citizen-in-americas-cross-hairs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
(“Within just two weeks, the American government had killed three of 
its own citizens in Yemen.”); see also Bruce Drake, Obama and Drone 
Strikes: Support but Questions at Home, Opposition Abroad, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (May 24, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2013/05/24/obama-and-drone-strikes-support-but-questions-at-
home-opposition-abroad/ (stating that “[a] Gallup poll, conducted in 
March found, that while 65% of Americans supported the use of drone 
strikes to kill suspected terrorists in other countries, 52% opposed such 
strikes if the targets were U.S. citizens”).  
57. See Statement of the Special Rapporteur Following Meetings in 
Pakistan, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS (Mar. 14, 2013), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ 
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13146&LangID=E. 
58. See Philip Rucker, Malala Yousafzai Meets with the Obamas in the Oval 
Office, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2013, 8:40 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/10/11/ 
malala-yousafzai-meets-with-the-obamas-in-the-oval-office/. 
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(The following discussion is from a video clip): 
VOICE: The use of drones is just one way that the U.S. military 
has approached unmanned combat. The Pentagon is also exploring 
another way. For more, TV’s Jim Spellman joins us from the 
newsroom with more. 
VOICE OF MR. SPELLMAN: Elaine, they look like something from a 
science fiction movie, but they are very real, and some fear these 
robots could become the drones of the future. 
He looks like a soldier, moves like a soldier, and marches like a 
soldier, but underneath that camouflaged uniform, Pet Man is 
something very different. Pet Man is a robot designed to test uniforms 
built by an American company called Boston Dynamics with funds 
from the U.S. Department of Defense. 
In the near future, robots like Pet Man and other less human 
looking machines could be used to keep first responders out of harm’s 
way during disasters like wild fires or the Fukushima nuclear disaster, 
but experts say it is inevitable that machines like these will one day 
be used in battle. It will be a substitute for what in the past would 
have been a human being in a cockpit or a human being in a tank or 
a foot soldier. 
For now, most of these robots are controlled by operators, but 
research is focusing on creating fully autonomous robots, who will 
make their own decisions when performing their missions. Enter 
Atlas, standing nearly two meters high and weighing 150 kilograms, 
Atlas is being provided to eight universities and research labs for 
further development, including greater levels of autonomy. 
There is no indication that any of these robots are meant to go to 
the battlefield, but fears that fully autonomous robots could be the 
next major evolution in weaponry concerns groups like the Campaign 
to Stop Killer Robots and the United Nations, which released a report 
last year calling for a moratorium on lethal autonomous robots until a 
legal framework for their use can be established. 
VOICE: We are headed in that direction where machines are going 
to be autonomous and can make their own decisions, but who is going 
to be held accountable? 
VOICE OF MR. SPELLMAN: Like the drone currently in use, the 
drones have the potential to greatly reduce the loss of life. For the 
country that has robot superiority, some day they may make conflicts 
easy to start and hard to finish. 
VOICE: Americans aren’t coming home in body bags because of 
drones, and it makes it palatable to the public. 
VOICE OF MR. SPELLMAN: Someone is coming home in a body bag 
but not us. 
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Ultimately, what is at risk may be our humanity as the line 
between weapon and warrior continues to blur. 
So how far off is it until we may see fully autonomous robots? 
The U.S. Department of Defense won’t say how far along they are, 
but the fed systems looking at varying degrees into autonomy are 
already in place in Israel and the demilitarized zone in Korea and on 
some U.S. naval vessels. And right now, the U.K. is testing a 
semiautonomous stealth drone called Taranis, which can find and 
choose its own targets. At the moment, it is said the operator will 
make the final decision to engage a target so still a few steps away 
from full autonomy lane. 
VOICE: All right. Jeff Spellman in our Washington newsroom. 
Thanks. 
PROFESSOR DAVIS: So let me just end up with—I mean, it is not 
so far off. You know, there is a really good book I would recommend 
called Wired for War by Peter Singer,59 where he talks about drone 
technology. He says it’s like comparing the Model T to the Tesla. He 
says we are at the Model T stage with drones. In these autonomous 
machines, to carry out warfare is like the Tesla, and that’s where we 
are headed.60 Thirty-seven countries are now calling for a ban on 
autonomous lethal weapons.61 Because if a weapon—a machine—can 
make the decision, who is accountable? Because at the center of 
international humanitarian law is accountability. Someone has to be 
accountable for the decisions, so I recommend to you Wired for War. 
And again, back to President Obama, when the bodies of 
Ambassador Stevens and the others came back to Andrews Air Force 
Base, the President gave a talk there on the tarmac, and he talked 
about their sacrifice and the sacrifice of men and women serving the 
country, and he said, “[T]his country that we love will always shine as 
a light onto the world.”62 I think we do, but I think for the last twelve 
years we haven’t been a guiding light; we have been a warning light, 
and we need to return to our principles and our values and that body 
of law that we champion and stand up for, international humanitarian 
law, and those principles because, again, as I said, it became 
 
59. PETER W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND 
CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2009).  
60. Id. at 46–47, 110.   
61. Noel Sharkey, Computing Experts from 37 Countries Call for Ban on 
Killer Robots, INT’L COMM. FOR ROBOT ARMS CONTROL (Oct. 16, 2013), 
http://icrac.net/2013/10/ computing-experts-from-37-countries-call-for-
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62. Melanie Hunter, Obama: ‘Even in Our Grief We Will Be Resolute,’ 
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important, I think, with Syria, where we were about to launch an 
attack on Syria when we hadn’t been threatened or attacked. I think 
we can certainly debate that. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am Richard Wanerman. I am a second-year 
student here at Case. 
Getting back a little bit to the detentions and prosecutions, I 
believe there were some initial rumblings back in 2009 of closing 
Guantanamo and possibly moving all of them to the federal courts or, 
at least, moving them onto U.S. contiguous territory, but the political 
pressure obviously must be very high. Then there was the move to 
Michigan, to the abandoned prison, and that was problematic 
because, at least, there is a sizeable enough quantity of Congress that 
was vehemently opposed to this. So even if tomorrow the National 
Security Council and the President all say yes, let’s move them up 
here and do Article III prosecutions, you would still have a lot of 
Congressional opposition. 
What sort of arguments do you have non-politically as the former 
prosecutor, from a legal perspective, or even a military perspective, to 
say it is perfectly all right to move them up into the United States 
out of Guantanamo Bay and into a detention facility that is more in 
line with what the world expects? 
PROFESSOR DAVIS: Right. I think General Martins said there are 
about twenty that we either intend to prosecute or have been 
prosecuted.63 So it is a pretty small group. 
Remember we were told they were the worst of the worst. So out 
of 779, there are about twenty that we want to prosecute and hold 
accountable. I think the military commissions—like I said—we have 
had seven trials in twelve years. Five of those, the D.C. Circuit (the 
civilian court) said the offense they were convicted of was not a 
legitimate law of war offense, so they haven’t been a huge success. 
In the meantime, we have prosecuted hundreds and hundreds of 
similar cases in federal court successfully, securely, and have gotten 
what I think most people would consider good results. 
You know, the President—I get on Twitter quite a bit when I 
comment on this: “You know, Congress has made it impossible. It is 
not the President’s fault.” The most common response I get on 
Twitter is “You suck.” 
Which is not a particularly helpful comment, but Congress has 
made it difficult. When President Obama took office—remember John 
McCain and Barack Obama both said, “I want to close Guantanamo.” 
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So I am curious, I wonder what would happen if McCain had won. 
Would Guantanamo still be open? 
But it became the other side. Anything Obama was for, they were 
against. So you had this backlash, and I don’t think he was prepared 
for the backlash. I think he thought, “Look, we both agree we ought 
to close Guantanamo.” So I think when he signed that order on 
January 22, 2009, it was kind of like over and done, and he was not 
prepared for the backlash, and healthcare reform was number one, 
and the economy was crashing. I just don’t think he had the backbone 
to get it done. 
But for the first two years, he had a majority of Democrats in 
both the House and Senate until the Tea Party swept in, and that’s 
when the legislation began. The 2011 National Defense Authorization 
Act that President Obama promised he would veto64 if it included the 
NDAA, he included those provisions, but two years in a row, he did 
that. On New Years Eve, it has become: which is going to drop first—
Obama’s veto threat or the Big Ball at Times Square? 
And the veto threat has dropped twice, and he signed the NDAA 
that limits his authority to transfer detainees to the U.S. But my view 
is: look, if you have the unilateral authority to send a civilian agency 
to kill an American in another country, I think you have got the 
unilateral authority to bring detainees to the U.S. for prosecution in 
federal court. 
Now, there will be complaining for sure, but you got to man up 
and get in there and keep your word. You promised you were going to 
do it and do it because this has just been a blight on our reputation 
with our friends and our enemies alike. And we tried and failed, and 
we need to give up on this effort and use the courts that have the 
respect of the world. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could I ask you to look into your crystal 
ball twenty, thirty years from now the way things are going? Will the 
Fourth Amendment be as dead as the Tenth Amendment by then? 
PROFESSOR DAVIS: Well it certainly seems, again, if you are my 
age, and you look back at the TSA pat downs at the airport or the 
whole NSA spying program, the surveillance program, which they 
denied doing, and now it is pretty clear, and yes, there is an 
interesting debate with people like Edward Snowden. You know, is he 
a hero or villain or somewhere in between? 
But we have certainly gotten more comfortable, and like I said, I 
think it has become the new normal. We have a generation that grew 
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up in the post-9/11 environment, where that is just the way it is, and 
so I am hoping people will pay attention. I mean, if you really believe 
in the Constitution and liberty, and what it meant to be an 
American, you ought to be offended at what our country has done for 
the last twelve years. So I am hoping—I remember when I was your 
age, thirty years ago when I was in law school—I remember thinking, 
my generation, because I grew up in the post-Watergate Vietnam era, 
and I saw how my father’s generation had screwed up the country, 
that my generation was going to go out and change the world. Well, 
we haven’t done such a good job. 
So I am hoping your generation will do what my generation has 
failed to do and to make us that shining city on a hill that we ought 
to be and we can be if we just had the guts to do it. 
PROFESSOR COVER: So when General Martins was here last 
month, he understandably gave quite a defense of the commission he 
is now presiding over as Chief Prosecutor, and he acknowledged many 
of the problems and inadequacies that weren’t part of the 
commissions passed by Congress. But he would maintain now that 
pretty much they are fixed and makes the argument that really the 
commissions are needed, however, for two primary reasons: one, some 
instances, some level of hearsay must come up which is accepted in 
other tribunals outside the United States. 
And secondly, for some reason, security and classifications—that 
they couldn’t be prosecuted in federal courts. I just wonder what you 
say to both his praise of the current commissions and the need for 
them still. 
 
PROFESSOR DAVIS: Well, a couple things: one is, I think the 
current iteration of military commissions are vastly improved over the 
original. I mean, the original concept was you had some civilian 
political appointees that looked back at the trial of the Nazi saboteurs 
in 1942, which, if you are familiar with the case, you had the eight 
Nazi saboteurs dropped off by submarine come into the U.S.65 One 
guy decided he was going to go to the FBI and be a hero and turn 
everybody in. So between June of ‘42 and August of ‘42, he went from 
capture to prosecution in a military commission to Supreme Court 
review and execution and burial by the Anacostia River in 
Washington in a hundred days.66 
So it was swift, it was severe, and it was secret, and people saw 
that and said, “Hey, this worked really well in 1942. Let’s do it 
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again.” And so here we are in 2013, and we have completed seven 
cases, five of which the appellate court has said were convicted of 
offenses that aren’t really law of war offenses.67 So it has been a 
colossal failure. 
And in 2007, when I stood right here, under the original Bush 
order, I said “This is good stuff. You know, this will work.” And then 
the Supreme Court said, “No, it is not.” 
And then we passed the Military Commissions Act in 2009,68 and 
I went out and said, “Hey, this is even better. It was good before, but 
this is even better now,” and then President Obama shut that down, 
and then they have the Military Commissions Act of 2009 and we’re 
saying “Okay. This time it is really justice.” 
I think we had the opportunity to do this and do it right, and I 
think—to me, it is no longer a question of could we do it? It is: 
Should we do it? 
Because you could give KSM the most perfect trial in the history 
of jurisprudence, and 90 percent of the world is not going to believe it 
because we have screwed this up for so long and told the world over 
and over and over, “This time we got it right. This time we got it 
right. This time we got it right.” 
And if you look at the failures they have had at Guantanamo, 
where the sound went out—the judge thought he was in control of the 
courtroom—and the sound goes out. It turns out there is a secret CIA 
monitor somewhere that controlled the courtroom, and they spent two 
days arguing over whether Khalid Sheikh Mohammed can wear a 
camouflaged vest to court and all the things that aren’t issues in 
federal court because we are making it up as we go at Guantanamo. 
So I think they are vastly improved over what they were, but 
again, I didn’t hear his talk here. But I have heard General Martins 
and Attorney General Holder at forums, where they have said, “Well, 
it is almost. It is nearly. It is virtually. It is as good as federal court.” 
Well, if it is that close, then why do we need two different 
processes? And we have proved that with Ghailani. Ghailani was one 
of the high value detainees held at Guantanamo, held by the CIA, 
prosecuted, and convicted in federal court, and doing life without 
parole.69 So we have proven that the federal courts can work.  
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We just prosecuted Bradley Manning.70 I was an expert witness 
for Bradley Manning at his court-martial recently, which was a case 
that was centered entirely on classified information. I mean, every 
charge against him was based on classified information, and we had a 
court-martial, an existing process that was largely—I mean, there are 
some critics of the proceedings—but they were largely open in a 
credible forum, with existing rules and procedures, and he was 
convicted, and the world is still turning. 
So we have got federal courts. We have got courts-martial. I think 
what Guantanamo and the military commissions is not so much about 
what they did to us—it is about what we did to them that we want 
to hide from the public. 
With KSM, I can tell you, like I said, we were building the case 
against these guys without using any information we obtained with 
enhanced interrogation techniques. Like with KSM and the 9/11 
cases, we were building the case, having set aside and walled off 
anything they said in U.S. custody. And I can tell you any attorney 
that can’t convict KSM without using his statements ought to find 
another line of work. 
So I think it is a question. I think there are some on the other 
side that say, by God, we are going to do this, and we are going to do 
it. And it has become more a principle than it is the practicality of 
whether it is really necessary. 
So I am hopeful that at some point—and I don’t have a real keen 
insight in how the President works or thinks, but it occurred to  
me—remember when they had the Bush library dedication a couple 
months ago? 
And I remember the President was sitting there on the podium, 
President Obama, and that week on the news, there was debate about 
the Bush legacy and was Bush the worst president in the history of 
the United States? And what was his legacy from his two terms in 
office? 
I was hoping that President Obama was sitting there on that 
podium thinking, “In a couple years, there is going to be a dedication 
of my library, and people are going to be debating what was my 
legacy. And I campaigned for office swearing I would close 
Guantanamo and end the military commissions and live up to those 
principles I talked so lawfully about, and do I want my legacy to be 
that I perpetuated for eight years the things that I condemned?” 
So I am hoping these next three years he has focused on how he is 
going to be remembered and what his legacy is going to be and what’s 
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important for the country, and it is our values and our principles, and 
our respect for the rule of law that makes us exceptional. 
